

our allies in Western Europe are on the verge of a deep and expensive and very dangerous involvement in yet another area of the Balkans. Unfortunately, and once again, I have yet to hear from the executive, and from the administration—more especially the President—to explain to the Congress nor, more important, the American people, why is this in our vital national interest to get in the middle of this growing conflict.

I think I can make a pretty good case in that regard, because I just returned from the three new prospective NATO countries—Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary—with the distinguished chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senator SHELBY. To a person, every official whom we met with in those three countries indicated that what NATO does with regard to Kosovo and what we continue to do in Bosnia is the real test of NATO: What it will be; what it will do; what our involvement will be; if, in fact, we have a Palestinian kind of situation in the middle of Europe with Bosnia and Kosovo; whether or not we can end this kind of ethnic strife.

So I think you could probably make a case for our involvement in Kosovo, but I have yet to hear from anybody in the administration other than reacting to news accounts or to questions. I think it is time we heard.

On the other side of it, we don't want to back into a situation where there is no end in sight, no exit strategy, and no real consideration in terms of cost and involvement.

The media reports are very clear that the Yugoslavian leader, Mr. Milosevic, is taking very hard and brutal action against the ethnic Albanians who are living in Kosovo. They comprise 90 percent of the population. This is the same kind of activity that he promoted in regards to Bosnia and the breakup there.

We are making some diplomatic efforts. We have people there working overtime, but these efforts seem to keep changing. We have drawn several lines in the sand with threats of severe reprisals if the Serbian action against the Albanian population does not cease, and those lines in the sand are still there, they have been gone over, and the activity continues. So much for any kind of believability in regards to our commitment.

The Albanian rebels, known as the KLA, are simply growing in strength and the fighting is growing more fierce. There is no real peaceful solution in sight. The United States and NATO have threatened military action and they have had a military demonstration. It was a fly-over or fly-by. It was called "Determined Falcon." I really don't know how determined that falcon is, but neither side has offered to end the conflict and efforts to bring them to the table to get a solution have failed. In fact, the KLA is really, I think, buoyed by the apparent Western support for their cause. Obviously,

they are not interested in backing off now.

Mr. Milosevic, having observed our unwillingness to carry out our threats in the past, and coupled with the strong support of the Serbian people to put an end to the rebel uprising in Kosovo, has no reason to back off, either. So we have a standoff.

We have now started an international monitoring program in Kosovo "aimed at bringing peace to this strife-torn region."

Mr. President, I want everybody to understand this. This is a very important development. This observer group is comprised of about 40 diplomats and "military experts" attached to embassies in Belgrade. Our "military experts" are unarmed U.S. military forces from the European Command. This means we have U.S. personnel now in this kind of a situation.

I was reading press reports about it several days ago, and they are in white cars, very clearly marked. You hope, obviously, the white cars will be very clearly marked so they will avoid any kind of hostilities. In other words, if you are traveling in a white car and either side wants to do great mischief—and that is probably not the right word for it—why certainly, obviously, they would be highlighted.

I have several concerns, Mr. President, about all of this: We are, once again, backing into a military commitment in regard to Kosovo. The term of "unarmed military observers or experts" certainly brings back some memories of other situations where we have backed into those conflicts. It is *deja vu* all over again. We are running a great risk that our "military experts" or diplomats could be in harm's way.

NATO is conducting contingency planning that could involve thousands of military troops to separate the warring factions or impose peace. I must tell you, in talking to a British general at the ceremony celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Berlin airlift, when I was talking about this, I asked the general, "How many people would it take to really maintain order on that border?" And there have been estimates of anywhere from 7,000 to 25,000. It is very difficult terrain.

He said, "Oh, my no, it would take upwards of 70,000."

"Seventy thousand?" My mouth, obviously, dropped a little bit.

He said, "Of course, we don't intend on doing that." But, of course, then we didn't intend on doing that in other rather political involvements of gradualism that we have had around the world, and I am not going to spell those out in specific terms. I think everybody here knows what we are talking about. So we have those contingency plans that could involve thousands of military troops.

The costs, both in dollars and the impact on our already-stressed military, are potentially very devastating. I remember the briefing that we had in re-

gard to India and Pakistan, and our esteemed Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was talking about the related situation in regard to Kosovo and indicated that we might have to become much more involved there.

Senator STEVENS, the distinguished chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, said, "Wait a minute, we do not have the money, we do not have the funds, we do not have the materiel, we do not have the men and women in uniform to get the job done. We are already committed in the gulf. We are already committed in Bosnia. Most of those funds in the past have been taken out of the readiness account—we are not paying for it—and that is a real problem." I think the Senator's sense of urgency in his response to the Secretary was well taken.

There are many unanswered questions on how this conflict in Kosovo is in our vital national interest. Let me stress vital national interest. I do think it is in the best interest of NATO. I think we have to be very careful; I think we have to be very firm.

Senator LIEBERMAN, the distinguished Senator from Connecticut, and the former distinguished majority leader in the Senate and my colleague and longtime friend, Bob Dole, indicated we must take aggressive and very positive action. There are unexplained scenarios of Kosovo leading to a larger war in Europe if this conflict is not ended now.

But my primary concern in bringing this up, Mr. President, is this: This whole issue has yet to be addressed by the President and, for that matter, to some extent by this Congress in any way. Yet, here we are backing into a situation with "military observers" and with contingency plans that could involve thousands more. The President should not, nor will the Congress let him, commit the men and women of our Armed Forces without defining our national interests. That is fundamental, and I think we ought to spell that out. I call for the President to do so and to outline the objectives in the exit strategy for any involvement in that part of the world and in regard to Kosovo in particular.

With that, Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SESSIONS). Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE VERY BAD DEBT BOXSCORE

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at the close of business Friday, July 17, 1998, the federal debt stood at \$5,532,637,423,771.79 (Five trillion, five hundred thirty-two billion, six hundred

thirty-seven million, four hundred twenty-three thousand, seven hundred seventy-one dollars and seventy-nine cents).

One year ago, July 17, 1997, the federal debt stood at \$5,363,009,000,000 (Five trillion, three hundred sixty-three billion, nine million).

Twenty-five years ago, July 17, 1973, the federal debt stood at \$455,472,000,000 (Four hundred fifty-five billion, four hundred seventy-two million) which reflects a debt increase of more than \$5 trillion—\$5,077,165,423,771.79 (Five trillion, seventy-seven billion, one hundred sixty-five million, four hundred twenty-three thousand, seven hundred seventy-one dollars and seventy-nine cents) during the past 25 years.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I rise today to express my profound concern for the International Criminal Court that was overwhelmingly approved in Rome late on Friday. I was pleased that the United States voted against final passage of this global criminal court. The Administration should be commended for rejecting this international folly, which would have been dead on arrival in the Senate.

Unfortunately, however, the danger from this Court has not passed. The Administration is already coming under pressure from proponents of the court to reconsider its opposition. Even more disturbing is the possibility that the Court would assert jurisdiction over American soldiers, despite the American refusal to join the court. The Administration should "just say no" to any efforts to get the United States to reconsider or to signal any informal compliance with the Court.

As both a Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and as Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Federalism and Property Rights, I find the International Criminal Court profoundly troubling. If there is one critical component of sovereignty it is the authority to define crimes and punishments. This Court strikes at the heart of sovereignty by taking this fundamental power away from individual countries and giving it to international bureaucrats.

There are other aspects of this Court that are equally troubling. As examples, the authorization of international independent prosecutors, the expense of such a permanent court, and the lack of any clear limits on the Court's jurisdiction are all alarming. But no aspect of this Court is more troubling than the fact that it has been framed without any apparent respect for—indeed, in direct contravention of—the United States Constitution.

As Chairman of the Constitution Subcommittee, I have a number of particular concerns about the Court. First and foremost, I remain concerned by the possibility that Americans could be dragged before this Court and denied the protections of the Bill of Rights.

Even more fundamentally, I am concerned that the Administration participated in these negotiations without making any effort to insist that the proposed International Criminal Court incorporate and honor the Bill of Rights. Even if one concedes that we need an International Criminal Court—which I emphatically do not—we should certainly insist on respect for the Bill of Rights as the price of American admission.

America's ideals and values are ascendant in the post-Cold War world. America's position as world leader is, in no small part, a product of a Constitution that is the envy of the world. The Administration should be justly proud of that Constitution and should have insisted that those principles form the cornerstone for any International Criminal Court. That unfortunately was not the official position of this Administration.

In the United States, there is a right to a jury of your peers. In the United States, there is a privilege against self-incrimination. In the United States, we have eliminated the prospect of criminal liability for ill-defined common law crimes. In the United States, the Constitution limits the authority of prosecutors. None of these protections will be guaranteed for defendants brought before this international star chamber.

The proposed Court negotiated in Rome neither reflects nor guarantees the protections of the Bill of Rights. The Administration was right to reject the Court and must remain steadfast in its refusal to join a court that stands as a rejection of American constitutional values. We must never trade away American sovereignty and the Bill of Rights so that international bureaucrats can sit in judgment of the United States military and our criminal justice system.

In today's New York Times, there is an opinion piece in which Anthony Lewis chastises the United States for missing a historic opportunity by failing to vote in favor of the International Criminal Court. The author states that the vote to form the International Criminal Court "will be seen as a turn in the road of history." That is perhaps the only point in the piece with which I agree. The approval of this Court was indeed "a turn in the road of history." By ceding the authority to define and punish crimes, many nations took an irrevocable step to the loss of national sovereignty and the reality of global government. I, for one, am heartened to see that the United States took the right turn on the road of history, and I will work hard to ensure that there is no backtracking.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Morning business is now closed.

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1999

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now resume consideration of H.R. 4112, which the clerk will report.

The bill clerk read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 4112) making appropriations for the Legislative Branch for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1999, and for other purposes.

The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.

AMENDMENT NO. 3220

(Purpose: To amend House legislative branch appropriation bill to include Senate items.)

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Alaska [Mr. STEVENS], for Mr. BENNETT, for himself and Mr. DORGAN, proposes an amendment numbered 3220.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The text of the amendment is printed in today's RECORD under "Amendments Submitted.")

Mr. STEVENS. This is, in effect, putting down our version of the bill, and it becomes original text.

AMENDMENTS NOS. 3221, 3222, AND 3223, EN BLOC,
TO AMENDMENT NO. 3220

Mr. STEVENS. I send to the desk a series of second-degree managers' amendments and ask for their consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendments.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Alaska [Mr. STEVENS], for Mr. BENNETT, for himself and Mr. DORGAN, proposes amendments numbered 3221, 3222, and 3223, en bloc.

The amendments are as follows:

AMENDMENT NO. 3221

(Purpose: To increase the appropriation for Capitol Police expenses)

On page 14, line 24, strike "\$6,077,000" and insert "\$6,297,000".

AMENDMENT NO. 3222

On page 2, line 9, strike "\$79,183,000" and insert "\$87,233,000".

On page 2, between lines 21 and 22, insert the following:

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

For salaries of the Committee on Appropriations, \$6,050,000.

On page 3, line 25, strike "\$19,332,000" and insert "\$21,332,000".

On page 4, line 22, strike "\$75,600,000" and insert "\$66,800,000".

On page 5, line 10, strike "\$7,905,000" and insert "\$8,655,000".

On page 12, between lines 2 and 3, insert the following:

SEC. 10. (a) The Committee on Appropriations is authorized in its discretion—

(1) to hold hearings, report such hearings, and make investigations as authorized by paragraph 1 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate;

(2) to make expenditures from the contingent fund of the Senate;